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Victim Impact Evidence, Arbitrariness, and the
Death Penalty: The Supreme Court Flipflops
in Payne v. Tennessee
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal pun-
ishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevo-
cability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the
convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique,
finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our
concept of humanity.'
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I. INTRODUCTION
The penalty of death is the ultimate punishment society can im-
pose-its purpose, effectiveness, and appropriateness in the Ameri-
can system of justice continue to be hotly debated.2 In 1972, the
1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
2. See, e.g., HUGO A. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (3d ed. 1982)
(including essays on both sides of the debate); Robert Robertson et al., Project, The
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Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia,3 declared unconstitutional
those death penalty statutes that provided the jury complete discre-
tion in choosing between life and death for a particular defendant.
Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia4 and its four companion
cases,5 the Court ruled that death penalty statutes guiding jury dis-
cretion or requiring specific jury findings as a predicate to the im-
position of death were constitutionally permissible.
Central to the Court's review of the death penalty statutes was
its recognition that death is "unique in its severity and irrevocabil-
ity."6 The Court was concerned that the death penalty not be "im-
posed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk
that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.'' 7
This concern led to the Court's mandate that death penalty stat-
utes focus on the defendant as an individual and on the circum-
stances of the crime to allow for individualized sentencing
determinations.8
Concurrent with the development of greater substantive and
procedural safeguards for capital defendants was a growing aware-
ness that the needs of crime victims were not being met.9 Societal
recognition of the financial and emotional burdens carried by crime
victims led to legislative initiatives designed to ameliorate these
effects. 10
In 1982, Congress passed the Victim and Witness Protection Act
("VWPA")' to "enhance and protect the necessary role of crime
Death Penalty: Personal Perspectives, 22 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (1990) (interviewing prose-
cutors, defense attorneys, judges, and prisoners).
3. 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam).
4. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
5. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding the mandatory imposition of the
death penalty in only five specific situations, if the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt
that three separate conditions are met); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (uphold-
ing guided discretionary systems); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (striking
down mandatory systems); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (same).
6. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (citations omitted). See generally BARRY NAKELL & KEN-
NETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY 29-37 (1987) (tracing
the "death is different" doctrine through subsequent Supreme Court decisions).
7. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188.
8. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983) ("What is important at the selection
stage [of a capital trial] is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of
the individual and the circumstances of the crime." (citations omitted)).
9. Maureen McLeod, Victim Participation at Sentencing, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 501,
501-02, 507 (1986) [hereinafter McLeod, Victim Participation].
10. See id. at 501. The reforms focused, in part, on state compensation programs and
the use of restitution as a sentencing alternative. Id. Additionally, legislation provided
for increased protection of, and assistance to, the crime victim. Id.
11. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-1515 (1988) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-3580 (1982)). Sections
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victims and witnesses in the criminal justice process."1 2 The
VWPA amends Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure to require the use of victim impact statements ("VIS") in fed-
eral presentence reports. 13  Recognizing that most traditional
crimes fall within state jurisdiction, the VWPA was intended to
serve as a model to the states. 14 Following Congress's lead, at least
forty-eight states passed legislation authorizing the use of victim
impact statements at sentencing. 5
Commentators have been divided over whether recognition of
victim impact evidence conflicts with the constitutional rights of
capital defendants.' 6 The United States Supreme Court, however,
recently resolved this dilemma. In Payne v. Tennessee,' 7 the Court
expressly overruled its prior decisions in Booth v. Maryland 8 and
South Carolina v. Gathers '9 and held that the Eighth Amendment
does not prohibit a jury from considering victim impact evidence.
The Payne Court found that evidence of the victim's personal char-
acter or of the emotional impact of the crime on the victim's family
is germane to the jury's determination of whether the death penalty
should be imposed. 20  The Court further held that the Eighth
Amendment does not proscribe the use of such evidence in the
prosecutor's arguments at the sentencing hearing.2'
This Note analyzes Payne v. Tennessee and its impact on sen-
tencing in capital cases. It begins by reviewing the Court's deci-
3579-80 were amended and codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-64 by Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 212, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987, 2010 (1984).
12. VWPA § 2(b)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 1512 notes.
13. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(D).
14. Dina R. Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform or Reprisal?, 27 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 391, 393 (1989) (citing VWPA § 2(b)(3)).
15. Id. at 399.
16. See, e.g., Susan A. Jump, Booth v. Maryland- Admissibility of Victim Impact
Statements During Sentencing Phase of Capital Murder Trials, 21 GA. L. REV. 1191,
1209-13 (1987) (arguing that victim impact statements result in the violation of the con-
stitutional requirement that the death penalty not be imposed in an arbitrary and unpre-
dictable fashion); Jackson R. Sharman III, Constitutional Law: Victim Impact
Statements and the Eighth Amendment-Booth v. Maryland, II HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 583, 589-93 (1988) (stating that reference of the impact on the victim used only in
determining the degree of punishment after a finding of guilt, poses no constitutional
problems); Phillip A. Talbert, The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the Criminal
Sentencing Decision, 36 UCLA L. REV. 199, 231-32 (1988) (positing that victim informa-
tion that diverts the sentencing judge's or jury's attention from the defendant is unconsti-
tutional regardless of whether the sentencing hearing is capital or non-capital).
17. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
18. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
19. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
20. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2608.
21. Id. at 2609.
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sions in Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia to assess the
rationale behind these capital sentencing decisions.22 It then
briefly examines the legislative response to the Furman decision, by
reviewing current death penalty statutes,23 and to the "victims
rights" movement, by reviewing the admissibility of victim impact
statements. 24 The Court's decisions in Booth and Gathers on the
admissibility of victim impact statements will then be examined. 25
Finally, this Note analyzes Payne v. Tennessee and concludes that
the Court committed a grave error in overruling its previous
decisions.26
II. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court's decision in Payne v. Tennessee articulates
the friction inherent in a system that protects the defendant on the
one hand and that has become increasingly sensitive to the needs of
the victim on the other. This section provides the background to
that conflict by first examining the Supreme Court's Eighth
Amendment death penalty cases. Next, it will survey legislation
that defines the rights of both the criminal and the victim. Finally,
it will analyze the precedent overruled by Payne.
A. The Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Cases
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution provides: "Exces-
sive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."' 27 While no majority of
the Supreme Court has held that the death penalty itself violates
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment,28 the Court has held that certain applications of the death
penalty can violate that Clause.
Before 1972, most death penalty statutes provided the jury with
unbridled discretion to decide whether to impose the death penalty
once it convicted a defendant of a capital crime.29 In making its
decision, however, the jury was not privy to information specific to
22. See infra part II.A.
23. See infra part II.B.1.
24. See infra part II.B.2.
25. See infra part II.C.
26. See infra parts III-V.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
28. See infra note 41.
29. WELSH S. WHITE, LIFE IN THE BALANCE, PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN CAPI-
TAL CASES 2 (1984); see also infra notes 77-80 (listing the Illinois 1971 death penalty
provisions).
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the background and character of the accused other than the evi-
dence presented at trial to determine the accused's innocence or
guilt.3" The capital penalty statutes enumerated no specific legal
guidelines relevant to the sentencing decision.31 Thus, the issue in
Furman v. Georgia 32 was whether the imposition and execution of
the death penalty under these circumstances constituted cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 33 That question failed to generate a unified re-
sponse. In total, nine separate opinions added to the Court's per
curiam disposition of the case. Five supported the decision to in-
validate the death penalty statutes, while each of the four dissent-
ing Justices wrote his own opinion against this result.34
In Furman, several Justices examined the origins and judicial
history of both the Eighth Amendment guarantee against the in-
fliction of cruel and unusual punishment and of capital punishment
specifically. 35 Against this analytical framework, a majority of the
Court refused to find that capital punishment is per se unconstitu-
tional.36 However, because "Death is ... an unusually severe pun-
ishment, unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity, '37
the Court agreed that it may only be levied consistently, untainted
by impermissible influences.
The majority's ultimate decision was influenced by several stud-
ies on the death penalty. 3 Two striking facts surfaced from this
research, namely, that the death penalty was imposed infre-
30. JOHN KAPLAN & ROBERT WEISBERG, CRIMINAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS
424 (1986) ("[T]he jury [did not] have the benefit of any special information about the
defendant's background, character, or previous criminal record.").
31. See id. at 422-23.
32. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
33. Id. at 239 (per curiam). At issue in the cases consolidated in Furman were the
death penalty statutes of Georgia and Texas. As late as 1971, the unguided discretion
system was upheld as constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 196 (1971).
34. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Douglas, Stewart, and White concurred in the result.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 241. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, and
Powell dissented. Id. at 240.
35. See id. at 242-44, 258-69, 316-28, 376-89, 421-27 (concurring opinions of Justice
Douglas, Justice Brennan, and Justice Marshall, and dissenting opinions of Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Powell, respectively).
36. Id. at 240, 306, 310, 375, 405, 414, 465 (concurring opinions of Justice Douglas,
Justice Stewart, and Justice White, and dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Burger, Jus-
tice Blackmun, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist, respectively).
37. Id. at 287 (Brennan, J., concurring). This theme echoes throughout Furman. See
supra text accompanying note 1.
38. See id. at 250-51 nn.15-17 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing, e.g., HuGo A.
BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 474 (rev. ed. 1967)).
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quently 39 and that when it was imposed, it disproportionately af-
fected blacks, the "poor, [the] young, and [the] ignorant. ' ' 40 The
only consensus reached by the majority4' was that this information
led to the inescapable conclusion that the death penalty was arbi-
trarily imposed and, as such, violated the Eighth Amendment's
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.42
The Furman decision had an immediate and far-reaching impact
on state death penalty laws. On the same day that it decided
Furman, the Supreme Court also invalidated the capital punish-
ment statutes of over forty other states and issued a series of per
curiam orders vacating the death sentences of some six hundred
death row inmates.43 This action, however, did not foreclose the
39. "The outstanding characteristic of our present practice of punishing criminals by
death is the infrequency with which we resort to it. The evidence is conclusive that death
is not the ordinary punishment for any crime." Id. at 291 (Brennan, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 250 & nn. 15-17 (Douglas, J., concurring). One writer commented: "'Not
only does capital punishment fail in its justification, but no punishment could be invented
with so many inherent defects. It is an unequal punishment in the way it is applied to the
rich and to the poor.'" Id. at 251 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting LEwis E. LAWES,
LIFE AND DEATH IN SING SING 155-60 (1928)). Additionally, Douglas provided:
"[W]here a white and a Negro were co-defendants, the white was sentenced to
life imprisonment or a term of years, and the Negro was given the death pen-
alty.... The Negro convicted of rape is far more likely to get the death penalty
than a term sentence, whereas whites and Latins are far more likely to get a
term sentence than the death penalty."
Id. (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Rupert C. Koeninger, Capital Punishment in
Texas, 1924-1968, 15 CRIME & DELINQ. 132, 141 (1969)).
41. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that the death penalty is inher-
ently unconstitutional. Id. at 305, 360 (Brennan, J., concurring and Marshall, J., concur-
ring, respectively). Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White found the death penalty
unconstitutional as applied. Id. at 256-57, 309-10, 310-13 (Douglas, J., concurring, Stew-
art, J., concurring, and White, J. concurring, respectively).
42. See id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart stated:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck
by lightening is cruel and unusual .... I simply conclude that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death
under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so
freakishly imposed.
Id. (Stewart, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Brennan wrote:
When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in
which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is
being inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery sys-
tem.... [O]ur procedures are not constructed to guard against the totally capri-
cious selection of criminals for the punishment of death.
Id. at 293-95 (Brennan, J., concurring). In addition, Brennan stated that "the very words
'cruel and unusual punishments' imply condemnation of the arbitrary infliction of severe
punishments." Id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring).
43. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Nebraska, 408 U.S. 937 (1972) (per curiam); Davis v. Con-
necticut, 408 U.S. 935 (1972) (per curiam); Duisen v. Missouri, 408 U.S. 935 (1972) (per
curiam); Eaton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 935 (1972) (per curiam); Fuller v. South Carolina, 408
1992] Payne v. Tennessee
potential validity of statutes that provided the jury with specific
guidelines for its decision.
After Furman, new capital punishment statutes were passed in
thirty-five states." This new legislation attempted to overcome the
constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman either by providing
for a mandatory death sentence upon conviction for a capital of-
fense or by providing for a balancing of statutorily defined aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances.4 5 Additionally, many states
adopted the bifurcated trial procedure in capital cases.46
In 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia47 and its four companion cases,48
the Court reviewed the constitutionality of five amended state stat-
utes even though no person had been executed since Furman.49
The Court did not focus on the constitutionality of the death pen-
alty itself but on the procedures instituted by the states to impose
the punishment."° The Court upheld those statutes providing
guided discretion and struck down those imposing mandatory
penalties.5 1
U.S. 937 (1972) (per curiam); Hamby v. North Carolina, 408 U.S. 937 (1972) (per
curiam); Herron v. Tennessee, 408 U.S. 937 (1972) (per curiam); Kelbach v. Utah, 408
U.S. 935 (1972) (per curiam); Marks v. Louisiana, 408 U.S. 933 (1972) (per curiam);
McCants v. Alabama, 408 U.S. 933 (1972) (per curiam); Miller v. Maryland, 408 U.S.
934 (1972) (per curiam); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972) (per curiam); Scoleri v.
Pennsylvania, 408 U.S. 934 (1972) (per curiam); Seeney v. Delaware, 408 U.S. 939 (1972)
(per curiam); Sims v. Eyman, 408 U.S. 934 (1972) (per curiam) (striking the Arizona
death penalty statute); Smith v. Washington, 408 U.S. 934 (1972) (per curiam); Stewart v.
Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845 (1972) (per curiam); Thomas v. Florida, 408 U.S. 935 (1972)
(per curiam); Walker v. Nevada, 408 U.S. 935 (1972) (per curiam); Williams v. Ken-
tucky, 408 U.S. 938 (1972) (per curiam).
44. See WHITE, supra note 29, at 2.
45. Id. at 2-3; see NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 6, at 26-27.
46. Under this system, guilt is determined in one phase followed by a separate hear-
ing to determine punishment if the defendant is convicted. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL.,
EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 23 (1990) [hereinafter BALDUS ET AL.,
EQUAL JUSTICE].
47. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
48. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976).
49. NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 6, at 28.
50. In Gregg, the Court rejected the argument of petitioners in all five cases that the
death penalty under all circumstances constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Gregg,
428 U.S. at 169, 226-27; see Roberts, 428 U.S. at 350-56 (White, J., dissenting). Justices
Marshall and Brenran, based on their opinions in Furman, continued to adhere to the
view that the death penalty itself is unconstitutional. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 227-41
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. See supra note 5. In each of the five cases, the plurality opinions were comprised
of Justices.Stewart, Powell, and Stevens. Chief Justices Burger and Justices Rehnquist,
Blackmun, and White concurred in the judgments upholding the guided discretionary
systems. Justices Brennan and Marshall wrote separate dissenting opinions in Gregg,
Loyola University Law Journal
Central to each decision was the plurality's interpretation of
Furman that the death penalty "could not be imposed under sen-
tencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be
inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner."52 The guided dis-
cretionary systems under review defined statutory aggravating and
mitigating factors. 53 Under those statutes, juries were required to
find the existence of at least one aggravating factor and to consider
any mitigating factors before the death penalty could be imposed.54
Because each statute "require[d] the sentencing authority to focus
on the particularized nature of the crime, ' 55 the Court reasoned
that death would not be "wantonly" or "freakishly" imposed. 6
The Court therefore held that the statutes' individualized focus on
the crime and on its perpetrator met the Eighth Amendment guar-
antee against cruel and unusual punishment.57
In contrast with the guided discretionary systems, some state
legislatures sought to eliminate the arbitrariness associated with
fully discretionary systems by removing all sentencing discretion
from the jury. These capital punishment statutes automatically
imposed the death penalty when a defendant was convicted of first-
both reiterating their positions in Furman that the death penalty itself violates the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
52. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
53. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2503 (Michie Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)
(West Supp. 1976-77).
54. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164-65 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 248 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Although
Texas had not formally adopted a list of statutory aggravating circumstances, the Court
found that its action in narrowly defining the classes of murder eligible for death served
much the same purpose. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 270 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Ste-
vens, JJ.). Texas specified five classes of murder as eligible for the death penalty. Id.
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) ("For example, the Texas statute requires
the jury at the guilt-determining stage to consider whether the crime was committed in
the course of a particular felony, whether it was committed for hire .... ").
The Texas death penalty scheme today remains different from most other states' stat-
utes by not providing a statutory list of aggravating and mitigating factors. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (West 1989); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b)
(West 1989 and Supp. 1992); Mary Kay Sicola & Richard R. Shreves, Jury Consideration
of Mitigating Evidence: A Renewed Challenge to the Constitutionality of the Texas Death
Penalty Statute, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55, 64-66 (1988).
55. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Ste-
vens, JJ.).
56. Id. at 276 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). A'dditionally, the Geor-
gia statute (1) provided for a separate hearing to determine the appropriate punishment
for a convicted defendant; (2) expedited review by the state supreme court; and (3) re-
quired a determination of whether the death sentence was excessive or disproportionate
to the penalty imposed in comparable cases. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 163-67 (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
57. See, e.g., Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274-76 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
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degree murder. 8
The Court identified two major deficiencies in the mandatory
capital punishment schemes and held that they violated the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.59 First, the Court found that the
mandatory schemes were deficient because they made no al-
lowances for consideration of the defendant's character or of the
particular circumstances of the offense. 6° The view that death is
qualitatively different than any other punishment6 led to the
Court's conclusion that it could not condone a system that "treats
all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely indi-
vidual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated
mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of
death."62 Instead, the Court maintained that the respect for hu-
manity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires that the partic-
ular characteristics of the defendant and the specific nature of the
crime be considered before the death penalty may be constitution-
ally imposed.6 3
The Court found a second major infirmity in the mandatory cap-
ital punishment statutes. Central to the decision in Furman was
the Court's view that standardless jury discretion results in the ar-
bitrary imposition of death.6 The Gregg plurality found that
mandatory sentencing does not eliminate the arbitrariness fostered
by the pre-Furman system but rather results in similar "de facto
sentencing discretion. ' 65 The Court noted that juries persistently
refused to convict persons charged with first-degree murder under
mandatory death penalty statutes.66 This reluctance led the Court
to conclude that the mandatory systems perpetuated the arbitrari-
ness and capriciousness of capital sentences. 6 Thus, the Court ac-
58. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 285-86 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 329, 331 (opinion
of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (noting that the Louisiana statute also provided for
the mandatory death penalty for aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping,-and treason).
59. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
60. Id. at 292-301 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
61. Id. at 303-04 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
62. Id. at 304 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); see Roberts, 428 U.S. at
333 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
63. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
64. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
65. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); see Wood-
son, 428 U.S. at 302-03 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
66. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 301-02 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (ob-
serving that studies showed juries were frequently deterred "from rendering guilty ver-
dicts of first-degree murder because of the enormity of the sentence automatically
imposed").
67. Id. at 302 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
1992]
Loyola University Law Journal
cused the states of simply "paper[ing] over the problem of
unguided and unchecked jury discretion. '68
The decisions in these 1976 cases did not reject all jury discre-
tion. Instead, they approved capital punishment systems granting
jury discretion directed to the individual defendant and the specific
circumstances of the crime. In particular, by limiting the classes of
crimes rendering a defendant death-eligible, while at the same time
permitting leniency when justified by mitigating circumstances, the
Court reasoned that death penalty decisions could be fair and con-
sistent.69 As long as the focus remained on the defendant, the
Court found that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment guaran-
tees were satisfied.70
B. Legislative Responses
1. The Illinois Death Penalty
After Furman, most states revised their capital sentencing proce-
dures. The procedures that survived Supreme Court scrutiny (1)
limit imposition of the death penalty to those situations when spec-
ified aggravating circumstances are present;7 ' (2) direct the jury to
consider all relevant mitigating circumstances, not merely those
defined by statute;7 2 (3) provide for bifurcated trials;7 3 and (4) often
require appellate review to ensure that the death penalty is im-
posed consistently in comparable circumstances. 74 Due to its simi-
68. Id. (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
69. But cf Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331-36 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)
(holding that removal of all jury discretion is unconstitutional).
70. But see BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 24 ("[A]llowing the
sentencing judge or jury sufficient discretion to ensure that each defendant receives indi-
vidualized consideration creates a risk that basically similar defendants will receive differ-
ent sentences or that some defendants will be treated more or less harshly for
unconstitutional or inappropriate reasons.").
71. But see Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878-80 & n.17 (1983). The Constitution
does not prohibit the jury from considering non-statutory aggravating circumstances as
long as the sentence is "an individualized determination on the basis of the character of
the individual and the circumstances of the crime." Id. at 879 (citations omitted).
72. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (holding that a statute that limits the
jury's consideration to a specific list of mitigating factors violates the Eighth Amend-
ment); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (holding on the basis of
Lockett that capital defendants must be permitted to introduce all relevant mitigating
evidence).
73. See BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 23 ("The purpose of this
procedural change is to prevent otherwise inadmissible information from affecting the
decision on guilt, while ensuring that the jury makes the sentencing decision on the basis
of all the relevant evidence.").
74. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35(c)(3) (Michie 1990) (The Georgia Supreme
[Vol. 23
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larity to other death penalty laws, 5 this section will examine the
Illinois death penalty statute.76
Prior to Furman, Illinois authorized the death penalty for both
murder7 7 and aggravated kidnapping for ransom.78 However, the
statute provided no guidelines to assist the jury in its sentencing
determination. 79 Although the statute permitted the court to over-
ride the jury's recommendation, the statute did not delineate ap-
propriate circumstances for ignoring the jury's death sentence.80
This statute was among those held unconstitutional as a result of
the Supreme Court's decision in Furman.81
The current Illinois capital punishment statute, enacted in
1977,82 provides for the death penalty when a defendant who is
eighteen or older has been convicted of first-degree murder. Like
Court shall determine "[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to
the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.").
75. See infra note 84.
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (1989).
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (1971).
78. Id. para. 10-2 (1971).
79. Section 9-1(b) governed imposition of the death penalty for murder and provided:
A person convicted of murder shall be punished by death or imprisonment in
the penitentiary for any indeterminate term with a minimum of not less than 14
years. If the accused is found guilty by a jury, a sentence of death shall not be
imposed by the court unless the jury's verdict so provides in accordance with
Section 1-7(c)(1) of this Code.
Id. para. 9-1(b). Section 10-2(b)(1) addressed aggravated kidnapping:
A person convicted of aggravated kidnapping for ransom shall be punished by
death or imprisonment in the penitentiary for any indeterminate term with a
minimum of not less than 2 years. If the accused is found guilty by a jury, a
sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury's verdict so provides in
accordance with Section 1-7(c)(1) of this Code.
Id. para. 10-2(b)(l). Section 1-7(c)(1) set forth the trial procedures in a death penalty
case:
Where, upon a trial by jury, a person is convicted of an offense which may be
punishable by death, the jury may return a verdict of death. Where such ver-
dict is returned by the jury, the court may sentence the offender to death or to
imprisonment. Where such verdict is not returned by the jury, the court shall
sentence the offender to imprisonment.
Id. para. 1-7(c)(1).
80. Id. para. 1-7(c).
81. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972) (holding that under Furman, death penalty
statutory schemes such as ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 1-7, 9-1, 10-2 (1971), violate the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (1989). The first Illinois post-Furman death
penalty statute, enacted in 1973, was held unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court
in People ex reL Rice v. Cunningham, 336 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1975). For a discussion of the
early attacks on the constitutionality of the current Illinois statute, see J. Steven Beckett,
The 1977 Illinois Death Penalty: Individualized Focus under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, 62 CHI. B. REC. 284 (1981).
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 23
the Model Penal Code 8 3 and the statutes of most other states al-
lowing for capital punishment, 4 the Illinois statute provides for a
bifurcated trial 5 to determine the existence of aggravating circum-
stances warranting the imposition of the death penalty. 6 The stat-
ute also enumerates a non-exclusive list of mitigating factors that
the sentencing authority must consider when making its determi-
nation.87 In addition, any sentence of death is subject to automatic
83. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1980).
84. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-45 to -52 (1982); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-
11-103 (West 1990). Only Oregon and Texas do not provide the jury with a list of statu-
tory aggravating and mitigating factors. See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (1990); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (West 1989 and Supp. 1992). For a criticism of
the Texas approach to capital sentencing, see Sicola & Shreves, supra note 54, at 55.
Illinois differs from several other states by suspending the rules of evidence and al-
lowing ordinarily inadmissible hearsay during the penalty phase. For a full critique of
this procedure, see Mark Silverstein, Confrontation at Capital Sentencing Hearings: Illi-
nois Violates the Federal Constitution by Permitting Juries to Sentence Defendants to
Death on the Basis of Ordinarily Inadmissible Hearsay, 22 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 65 (1990).
85. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(d) (1989) (allowing for a separate hearing
at the request of the State).
86. The Illinois statute enumerates the following aggravating circumstances:
(1) the murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman killed in the course
of performing his official duties ... or
(2) the murdered individual was an employee of an institution or facility of the
Department of Corrections . . . or the murdered individual was an inmate at
such institution ... or
(3) the defendant has been convicted of murdering two or more individuals ...
or
(4) the murdered individual was killed as a result of the hijacking of an air-
plane, train, ship, bus . . . or
(5) the defendant committed the murder pursuant to a contract, agreement or
understanding by which he was to receive money or anything of value in return
... or
(6) the murdered individual was killed in the course of another felony... or
(7) the murdered individual was under 12 years of age and the death resulted
from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or
(8) the defendant committed the murder with intent to prevent the murdered
individual from testifying in any criminal prosecution . . . or
(9) the defendant, while committing an offense punishable under.., the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act, or while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to
commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or counseled, com-
manded ... the intentional killing of the murdered individual; or
(10) the defendant was incarcerated in an institution or facility of the Depart-
ment of Corrections at the time of the murder, and while committing an offense
punishable as a felony under Illinois law, or while engaged in a conspiracy or
solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or coun-
seled ... or caused the intentional killing of the murdered individual; or
(11) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner
pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b) (1989) (amended by P.A. 87-525, effective Jan. 1,
1992).
87. Section 9-1(c) directs:
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review by the Illinois Supreme Court.8
Although the jury still has wide latitude to impose capital pun-
ishment, the current Illinois statute provides guidelines where none
existed previously. By requiring a finding of at least one aggravat-
ing factor, the statute narrows the class of death-eligible defend-
ants.89 Furthermore, the defendant is statutorily empowered to
put on any mitigating evidence that might compel the jury to show
mercy.90 These changes, at least in theory, comport with the
Furman and Gregg dictates that the death penalty should be as-
sessed only when the sentencer considers the character of the de-
fendant and the nature of the crime. 9' To date, the changes in the
Illinois death penalty statute have enabled it to survive constitu-
tional challenges in the Illinois Supreme Court.92
The court shall consider, or shall instruct the jury to consider any aggravating
and any mitigating factors which are relevant to the imposition of the death
penalty. Aggravating factors may include but need not be limited to those fac-
tors set forth [supra note 86]. Mitigating factors may include but need not be
limited to the following:
(1) the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
(2) the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a
defense to prosecution;
(3) the murdered individual was a participant in the defendant's homicidal con-
duct or consented to the homicidal act;
(4) the defendant acted under the compulsion of threat or menace of the immi-
nent infliction of death or great bodily harm;
(5) the defendant was not personally present during commission of the act or
acts causing death.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(c) (1989).
88. Id. para. 9-1(i).
89. Id. para. 9-1(b) (amended by P.A. 87-525, effective Jan. 1, 1992); see Lawrence J.
Essig & Verlin Meinz, Death Eligibility: Statutory Aggravation Under the Illinois Death
Penalty Act, 74 ILL. B.J. 532, 534 (1986).
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b) (1989) (amended by P.A. 87-525, effective
Jan. 1, 1992).
91. The Illinois death penalty procedure is not without its critics. See, e.g., Patricia
Hartmann, Factors in Aggravation and Mitigation: A Trap for the Sentencing Judge?, 33
DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 369 (1984); Silverstein, supra note 84, at 80-83; Joel H. Swift, The
Two-Murder Rule in Illinois; A Potential Return to Arbitrary Imposition of the Death
Penalty, 32 DEPAUL L. REV. 789, 810 (1983).
92. See, e.g., People v. Eyler, 549 N.E.2d 268, 291 (Ill. 1989) (holding that the Illinois
statute does not unconstitutionally place on the defendant the burden of persuasion on
the question of whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to preclude the death
penalty); People v. Stewart, 520 N.E.2d 348, 357 (Ill. 1988) (holding that a survey relat-
ing to practices of Illinois prosecutors in seeking the death penalty did not support the
conclusion that the death penalty had been arbitrarily and capriciously imposed); People
v. Montgomery, 494 N.E.2d 475, 482 (Il. 1986) (holding that the Illinois statute is not
unconstitutional by virtue of the fact that the death penalty is mandatory when no miti-
gating factors exist, because that finding is synonymous with a finding that death is the
appropriate punishment).
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2. Victim Impact Statements
The United States Supreme Court 1970s death penalty decisions
and the ensuing reactions of the state legislatures stemmed from
the recognition that capital defendants deserve stringent safeguards
against arbitrary sentencing decisions. Concurrently, state legisla-
tures realized that the criminal justice system often leaves the
crime victim feeling dissatisfied, powerless, and resentful. 93 React-
ing to the growing victims' rights movement and to the need to
increase system efficiency, state statutes were enacted to enhance
victim participation in the criminal justice system.94 This section
will focus on the Illinois statutory provisions regarding victims'
rights.95
In 1984, Illinois enacted the Bill of Rights for Victims and Wit-
nesses of Violent Crime Act.96 Its stated purpose recognizes both
the necessity of showing compassion to the victims of violent crime
and the role victims play in the administration of justice.97 It de-
fines "victim" as any person who suffers physical injury or prop-
erty loss as a result of a violent crime.98 The statute enumerates
twenty-four specific victim's rights. 99 Additionally, victims may
93. See McLeod, Victim Participation, supra note 9, at 501-03; see also supra notes 9-
15 and accompanying text.
94. McLeod, Victim Participation, supra note 9, at 501-03. McLeod notes that the
primary benefit of increased victim involvement is greater system efficiency and effective-
ness. Id at 505.
95. See Hellerstein, supra note 14, at 391-409 (discussing the VWPA and surveying
the states' treatment of victim impact statements).
96. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 1401-1408 (1989).
97. Section 1402 provides:
The purpose of this Act is to ensure the fair and compassionate treatment of
victims and witnesses of violent crime and to increase the effectiveness of the
criminal justice system by affording certain basic rights and consideration to the
victims and witness of violent crime who are essential to prosecution.
Id. para. 1402.
98. Id. para. 1403(a). Section 1403(c) gives a broad definition of violent crime: "any
felony in which force or threat of force was used against the victim or any misdemeanor
which results in death or great bodily harm to the victim or any [involuntary manslaugh-
ter or reckless homicide]." Id.
99. To summarize, § 1404 provides the following victim rights:
(1) to be informed of the status of the investigation of the victim's case;
(2) to be informed of the return of an indictment;
(3) to be informed of the release of the defendant on bail;
(4) to have the details of any plea or verdict;
(5) to be notified of any hearings in the case whether or not the victim's pres-
ence is required, and be afforded the right to make a victim impact statement at
any sentencing hearing;
(6) to be notified before the State's Attorney makes any plea bargain offer or
enters into any negotiation with the defendant concerning a possible plea
bargain;
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present oral, prepared victim impact statements at the defendant's
sentencing hearing and the court is directed to consider these state-
ments when making the sentencing determination. 00 Of the forty-
eight states authorizing victim impact statements at sentencing,
twenty-nine grant the right to an oral presentation.' 0'
The permissible contents of the victim impact statement are not
directly defined by the Illinois statute. However, a comprehensive
study of nation-wide victim impact statements shows that the ma-
(7) to be notified of the ultimate disposition of the cases arising from an
indictment;
(8) to be informed of any appeals;
(9) to be notified of any petition for post-conviction review and the time of any
hearings;
(10) to be notified of the prisoner's final discharge from custody or any
furlough;
(11) to be informed of the defendant's release from custody where the defend-
ant had been committed to the Department of Mental Health;
(12) to be informed of victim advocate personnel of social services and financial
assistance available;
(13) to have stolen or other personal property held for evidentiary purposes
returned as expeditiously as possible;
(14) to be provided with employer intercession services to ensure that employ-
ers will cooperate with the system in order to minimize the victim's loss of pay;
(15) to be provided with a secure waiting area during court proceeding that
does not require the victim to be in close proximity to the defendant;
(16) to be provided with a translator if necessary;
(17) to be notified if the defendant escapes from custody;
(18) to be notified of parole hearings and be permitted to submit any informa-
tion for consideration by the Prisoner Review Board and be notified when the
prisoner has been granted parole;
(19) if the victim was killed by the defendant, the victim's family has the right
to be informed of the date of the defendant's trial;
(20) to be informed of their rights under the Act;
(21) to retain an attorney, at the victim's expense, who will receive all notices,
etc. as if the victim were a named party;
(22) to be informed at the sentencing hearing of the minimum amount of time
the defendant may actually be imprisoned;
(23) to have any victim impact statements forwarded to the Prisoner Review
Board for consideration;
(24) to be informed of any discharge entered by the Board if a victim impact
statement has been submitted.
Id. para. 1404. Rights (1), (3), (4), (6)-(l 1), and (23) are conferred only at the specific
request of the victim.
100. Section 1406 provides:
[T]he victim upon his or her request shall have the right to address the court
regarding the impact which the defendant's criminal conduct ... has had upon
the victim. If the victim chooses to exercise this right, the impact statement
must have been prepared in writing in conjunction with the Office of the State's
Attorney prior to the initial hearing or sentencing, before it can be presented
orally at the sentencing hearing.
Id. para. 1406.
101. See Hellerstein, supra note 14, at 399.
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jority of the states require objective information such as the eco-
nomic, 0 2 physical, 0 3 and psychological 104 consequences of the
crime. Additionally, a majority of the states allow, but do not re-
quire, subjective commentary. This subjective commentary may
include the victim's or the family's: (1) summary of the offense;'0 5
(2) opinion of the offender;0'6 (3) fear of revictimization;10 7 (4)
opinion on the recommended sentence;' and (5) own sentence
recommendation.' °9 While the objective information may help a
court to determine restitution," 0 it is not clear what weight a sen-
tencing authority should give to the subjective statements."'
C. Victim Impact Statements in Capital Penalty Hearings
In 1987, only four states restricted victim input to non-capital
cases. '  The constitutionality of the use of victim impact state-
ments during the sentencing phase of a capital trial was first con-
sidered by the Supreme Court in Booth v. Maryland.' 3
1. Booth v. Maryland
In Booth, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to death
for robbing and murdering an elderly couple.' ' 4 Before the sen-
tencing phase of the trial, the Division of Parole and Probation
compiled a presentence report on Booth's background, education,
102. Sixty-five percent of the states surveyed require information regarding medical
expenses incurred and the value of lost or stolen property and forty-five percent require
lost earnings data. Maureen McLeod, An Examination of the Victim's Role at Sentenc-
ing: Results of a Survey of Probation Administrators, 71 JUDICATURE 162, 166 (1987).
103. Over sixty percent of the states require information relating to the seriousness
and permanence of physical injury. Id.
104. Fifty-three percent require information regarding psychological or emotional in-
jury. Id. McLeod notes that claims of this type are "resistant to verification and rebut-
tal." Id. at 165.
105. Id. at 166 (68% of the states surveyed).
106. Id. (72% of the states surveyed).
107. Id. (71% of the states surveyed).
108. Id. (68% of the states surveyed).
109. Id. (62% of the states surveyed).
110. See McLeod, Victim Participation, supra note 9, at 501.
111. See Hellerstein, supra note 14, at 398. Questions regarding the victim's opinion
of the defendant and the appropriate penalty justify the characterization of victim in-
volvement at sentencing as an emphasis on the retributive and retaliatory aspects of pun-
ishment and as stressing personal vengeance. Id.
112. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.1 (Michie 1987); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 875(A)-(B) (West 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 982 (West 1986); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-1550(A) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
113. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
114. Id. at 498.
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employment history, and criminal record." 5 Pursuant to Mary-
land law, the report also included a victim impact statement
describing the effect of the crime on the victims' family. 1 6 The
VIS included moving testimony emphasizing the victims' personal
qualities, the profound emotional effect of the murders on the vic-
tims' family, and the family's opinions and characterizations of the
crime. 11 7 The prosecutor read these statements to the jury after
Booth's counsel successfully argued that the use of live witnesses
would increase the inflammatory effect of the information.a18
The Supreme Court granted certiorari' ' 9 to decide whether the
Eighth Amendment bars the presentation of victim impact evi-
dence to a capital sentencing jury. 20 Maryland argued that the
evidence presented in the VIS should be considered part of the cir-
cumstances of the crime because it presented the jury with the di-
rect, foreseeable consequences of the defendant's act.' 2' In essence,
the State contended that such evidence did not interject arbitrary
factors into the jury's decision. 22
The Supreme Court rejected the State's position.' 23 The Court
distinguished the peculiar nature of a capital sentencing hearing
from other criminal and civil contexts in which all foreseeable con-
sequences of a defendant's acts may be relevant. 24
The Court first noted that the Eighth Amendment requires the
jury to focus on the defendant as a uniquely individual human be-ing.125 Information presented in the VIS, however, focuses on the
character of the victim and the consequences of the crime to the
victim's family. 26  The Court reasoned that because murderers
generally do not choose their victims on the basis of the specific
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 499. For example, the VIS expressed the continuing anger, depression,
and fear experienced by the victims' family. Id. at 500. It also expressed their opinion
that the murderer could not be rehabilitated. Id. at 508. The full text of the victim
impact statement submitted to the Maryland trial court is appended to the Supreme
Court opinion. Id. at 510-15.
118. Id. at 501.
119. Booth v. State, 507 A.2d 1098 (Md.), cert. granted, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
120. Booth, 482 U.S. at 501-02. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Id. at 487. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and O'Connor each wrote dissenting opinions.
121. Id. at 503-04.
122. Id. at 503.
123. Id. at 509.
124. Id. at 504.
125. Id. (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
126. Id. at 504-05.
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effect the murder will have on the victim's family, a sentence influ-
enced by such evidence may result in the imposition of death based
on factors that were unknown to the defendant and irrelevant to
the defendant's decision to kill. 127 According to the Court, al-
lowing introduction of the VIS risked diverting the jury's attention
away from the defendant and the crime and focusing it instead on
information unrelated to the defendant's blameworthiness and
moral culpability. 28
Further, the Court found that case-by-case variations in the
quality of the information contained in the VIS raised several seri-
ous issues.1 29 In particular, the Court was concerned that juries
could be unduly and arbitrarily influenced by the varying degrees
in which a victim's family articulated the impact of the crime. 130
The Court also found that the use of the VIS offended due process
considerations because the information was not easily susceptible
to rebuttal. 31  Additionally, the focus on the victim insinuates that
defendants whose victims were perceived to be "assets to their
community" deserve a greater punishment than defendants whose
victims were perceived to be less important. 132 Moreover, the
Court reaffirmed that the Eighth Amendment requires a principled
127. Id. at 505.
128. Id. The Court acknowledged that in some cases the information found in the
VIS would be known by the defendant prior to the crime. Id. It further acknowledged
that its decision in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), held that the defendant's moral
culpability encompasses his or her degree of knowledge regarding the probable conse-
quences of the act. Booth, 482 U.S. at 505. The Booth Court nevertheless found that
much of the victim impact evidence is unforeseeable and that the nature of the informa-
tion creates the risk that the death sentence will be imposed arbitrarily. Id.
129. Booth, 482 U.S. at 505-06.
130. Id. at 506. In the Booth VIS, the victims' family was compelling in its expres-
sion of its grief, sense of loss, and desire for retribution. See id. at 510-15.
131. Id. at 506-07. The Court cited its opinion in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349
(1977), which held that due process requires that a defendant be given the opportunity to
rebut a presentence report. Booth, 482 U.S. at 506. Additionally, the Booth Court
explained:
A threshold problem is that victim impact information is not easily susceptible
to rebuttal. Presumably the defendant would have the right to cross-examine
the declarants, but he rarely would be able to show that the family members
have exaggerated the degree of sleeplessness, depression or emotional trauma
suffered.... Putting aside the strategic risks of attacking the victim's character
before the jury, in appropriate cases the defendant presumably would be permit-
ted to put on evidence that the victim was of dubious moral character .... The
prospect of a "mini-trial" on the victim's character is more than simply unap-
pealing; it could well distract the sentencing jury from its constitutionally re-
quired task-determining whether the death penalty is appropriate in light of
the background and record of the accused ....
Id. at 506-07.
132. Id. at 506 n.8.
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way to differentiate the rationale behind the cases in which the
death penalty is imposed from those in which it is not. 33
The Booth Court also addressed the admissibility of the opinions
and characterizations of the crime expressed by the family within
the VIS. 134 Reasoning that the only conceivable function served by
offering this type of information is to inflame the jury and distract
it from considering relevant evidence, the Court held that this part
of the VIS, too, was inadmissible.' 35 The Court reiterated its man-
date that "any decision to impose the death sentence must 'be, and
appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.' "136
Guided by the tenet that death is a "punishment different from
all other sanctions,"'' 37 the Booth Court concluded that the use of
the VIS at the penalty phase of a capital trial injects an impermissi-
ble factor of arbitrariness into the proceedings.' 38 The Court held,
therefore, that the introduction of the VIS violated the Eighth
Amendment.' 39 As a result, the Court invalidated the Maryland
statute insofar as it mandated the use of a VIS, and vacated
Booth's death sentence.140
Justice White dissented in Booth,' 4  and disagreed that the
Eighth Amendment erected a per se bar to the use of victim impact
statements in capital cases.' 42 Noting that punishment in non-capi-
tal cases may be enhanced based on the extent of the harm caused,
and not on the harm necessarily intended, Justice White found
nothing irregular in permitting a similar assessment by the jury in
a capital case. 43 White reasoned that victim impact statements
are, in fact, particularly pertinent in capital cases because the state
has a legitimate interest in neutralizing the effect of mitigating evi-
133. Id. at 506 (citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980)); Skipper v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
134. Booth, 482 U.S. at 508.
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)).
137. Id. at 509 n.12 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
138. Id. at 505.
139. Id. at 509. The holdings of Booth, 482 U.S. at 509 n.12, and South Carolina v.
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 811-12 (1989), apply only to capital cases. The Booth Court gave
no opinion as to whether a VIS may be permissible in the context of a non-capital case.
Booth, 482 U.S. at 509 n.12.
140. Booth, 482 U.S. at 509.
141. Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor and Scalia. Id. at 515. Justice Scalia also dissented and was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor. Id. at 519.
142. Id. at 518-19 (White J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 516-17 (White, J., dissenting).
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dence offered by the defense. 144
Addressing the majority's concern that the death penalty may be
imposed on the basis of the victim's "worth," Justice White admit-
ted that consideration of factors such as race is impermissible. 145
He maintained, however, that the majority failed to show that the
jury in Booth actually based its decision on impermissible factors
and would not assume such misconduct on the part of the jury.146
Justice White also dismissed the majority's concern that the dif-
fering abilities of victims' families to articulate their grief inter-
jected an element of arbitrariness into the sentencing result.147
Calling this a "makeweight consideration," White argued that no
two prosecutors possess the same ability to present arguments and
no two witnesses possess the same ability to present the facts. 48
He was similarly unimpressed by the majority's assertion that the
victim impact evidence was unrebuttable, stating that the argu-
ments were speculative and unconnected to the facts before the
Court. 149
Justice Scalia's dissent focused on consideration of the "defend-
ant's culpability," which the Court previously had defined as "the
defendant's personal responsibility and moral guilt."' 50 He argued
that the amount of harm caused by a defendant bears "upon the
extent of his 'personal responsibility.' "I" Justice Scalia further ar-
gued that the majority failed to recognize that "moral guilt" had
144. Id. at 517 (White, J., dissenting).
145. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
146. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 517-18 (White, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 518 (White, J., dissenting).
149. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801
(1982)). In Enmund v. Florida, the defendant was sentenced to death for his participa-
tion in a robbery that resulted in the death of the victims. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 785. The
Florida Supreme Court affirmed the sentence under its felony-murder rule although the
State presented no evidence to show that the defendant had murdered, attempted to mur-
der, or intended to murder. Id. at 786. After considering statutes and statistics relevant
to felony-murder death penalties, the United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that
the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment proportionality requirement. Id. at 801.
The Enmund Court held:
For purposes of imposing the death penalty, Enmund's criminal culpability
must be limited to his participation in the robbery, and his punishment must be
tailored to his personal responsibility and moral guilt. Putting Enmund to
death to avenge two killings that he did not commit and had no intention of
committing or causing does not measurably contribute to the retributive end of
ensuring that the criminal gets his just deserts.
Id.
151. Booth, 482 U.S. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at
801).
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never been the sole foundation for the determination of punish-
ment. 1 2 He contended that the particular harm caused to a vic-
tim's family is a foreseeable consequence of a defendant's crime.I"
Since it is foreseeable, Scalia found that victim impact evidence
forms a proper basis for assessing the defendant's personal respon-
sibility and thus his culpability. 154
In summary, the disagreement in Booth focused on whether con-
sideration of victim impact evidence enhances the jury's under-
standing of the circumstances of the crime and whether it relates to
the defendant's blameworthiness. The Justices further disagreed
on whether the potential inconsistencies in victim impact state-
ments violate the Court's dictate that the death penalty not be im-
posed in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Due to the
unforeseeability of the information contained in the victim impact
statement, the Booth majority found the VIS not only irrelevant to
the determination of the defendant's culpability, but also poten-
tially inflammatory.3 5
152. Id. at 519-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that defendants may
be held accountable for fortuitous events: "If a bank robber aims his gun at a guard, pulls
the trigger, and kills his target, he may be put to death. If the gun unexpectedly misfires,
he may not. His moral guilt in both cases is identical, but his responsibility in the former
is greater." Id. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He also used the Court's decision in Tison
v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), to support his argument. In Tison, two brothers planned
and assisted in their father's escape from prison. Tison, 481 U.S. at 139. In the course of
subsequent events, the father murdered four people. Id. at 141. The Court upheld the
death penalty levied against the brothers, although they had not participated directly in
the killings. Id. at 158. In fact, they testified to an agreement they had reached with their
father, prior to the prison escape, that no one would be hurt. Id. at 166 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Despite the factual similarity between Tison and Enmund, the Tison Court
used Enmund to justify its contrary holding:
Enmund held that when "intent to kill" results in its logical though not inevita-
ble consequences-the taking of human life-the Eighth Amendment permits
the State to exact the death penalty after a careful weighing of the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances. Similarly, we hold that the reckless disregard for
human life implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry
a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable mental state ....
Tison, 481 U.S. at 157.
153. Booth, 482 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 519-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 508. Arguing against this reasoning, hypotheticals were provided in both
dissenting opinions purporting to show that defendants may be found culpable for the
unintended, yet foreseeable, consequences of their acts. Id. at 516, 519 (White, J., dis-
senting and Scalia, J., dissenting, respectively). Justice White's hypothetical defendant
unintentionally killed a pedestrian while driving recklessly. Id. at 516 (White, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Scalia's defendant shot a guard during a bank robbery. Id. at 519 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). However, in both situations, the harm caused by the defendant was not only
a foreseeable result of the intended act, but a result traditionally punished by the criminal
justice system. See supra note 152.
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2. South Carolina v. Gathers
Two years later, the Supreme Court extended the rationale of
Booth in South Carolina v. Gathers.1"6 In Gathers, the defendant
was sentenced to death for the brutal murder and first-degree sex-
ual assault of a mentally impaired thirty-one-year-old man.1"7 The
victim, who considered himself a preacher, had been carrying a
booklet entitled The Game Guy's Prayer ("Prayer") when he was
murdered.' 58 During the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecutor
read the entire Prayer to the jury and centered his closing argu-
ments on the personal characteristics of the victim.' 59
Unlike the statements presented to the jury in Booth, the state-
ments in Gathers focused solely on the character of the victim and
not on the emotional harm caused to the victim's family or on the
family's opinion of the crime and of the defendant.'6 Moreover, in
Gathers, the prosecutor, and not the victim's family, was responsi-
ble for painting the portrait of the victim.16 '
The Supreme Court did not find these differences compelling. 162
The State argued that the evidence showing that the victim's pa-
pers had been scattered around his body during the crime163 de-
picted the circumstances of the crime and, therefore, was
information not foreclosed by Booth.'" The Court, however, ob-
served that no evidence showed that the defendant had read any of
these papers during the commission of the crime or that their con-
156. 490 U.S. 805 (1989). Justice Brennan wrote the opinion of the Court, in which
Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Id. at 806. Justice White also
filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 812. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined. Id. Justice Scalia wrote a
separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 823.
157. Id. at 806-07.
158. Id. at 807. The Prayer was among several papers and religious items found scat-
tered at the scene of the murder. Id. The Prayer analogized life to a sports event and
emphasized the virtues of good sportsmanship. Id. at 808-09.
159. Id. at 808-10. Rather than presenting new evidence at the sentencing phase, the
State readmitted the evidence presented at the guilt phase. Id. at 808. The prosecutor's
closing arguments, which included the contents of the Prayer, characterized the victim as
a defenseless, religious man. Id. at 808-10. The prosecutor also focused on the fact that
the victim was carrying his voter's registration card. Id. at 809.
160. Id. at 808-10.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 811 ("As in Booth, '[a]llowing the jury to rely on [this information] ...
could result in imposing the death sentence because of factors about which the defendant
was unaware, and that were irrelevant to the decision to kill.' " (quoting Booth v. Mary-
land, 482 U.S. 496, 505 (1987))).
163. Id.
164. Id.
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tents influenced his decision to commit the crime.'6 The Court
found, therefore, that the contents of the victim's papers were irrel-
evant to determining both the circumstances of the crime and the
defendant's moral culpability.'66 Thus, following Booth, the prose-
cutor's comments during closing argument were in error. 67
Gathers commanded a majority only because Justice White
joined the Court in an equivocal concurrence."16 Justices
O'Connor and Scalia wrote separate dissenting opinions primarily
expanding on the reasoning set forth by Justice Scalia in his Booth
dissent. 69
Although O'Connor asserted that she stood ready to overrule
Booth, her dissent stated that such action was not necessary for a
proper disposition of the Gathers case. 70 Justice O'Connor main-
tained that allowing the jury to consider the victim's personal char-
acteristics was not foreclosed by the Court's previous Eighth
Amendment holdings.' 7 ' She contended that such a consideration
was relevant to the proportionality requirement of Enmund v. Flor-
ida72 and that permitting the information predictably followed
from the Court's ruling in Tison v. Arizona.'73 O'Connor criticized
a result that would not give the sentencer a "'glimpse of the life' a
defendant 'chose to extinguish' "17 and argued that a system fo-
cusing entirely on the uniquely individual characteristics of the de-
165. Id at 811-12.
166. Id. at 812.
167. Id.
168. Justice White stated that "[u]nless Booth is to be overruled, the judgment below
must be affirmed." Id. (White, J., concurring). He authored one of the two dissenting
opinions in Booth. See supra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
169. Justice Scalia's dissent, which focused primarily on a discussion of stare decisis,
strongly advanced his opinion that Booth was wrongly decided and should be overruled.
Gathers, 490 U.S. at 823-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Based on his interpretation of the role
of stare decisis, Scalia argued that Booth should be overruled sooner rather than later in
order to prevent legislators from codifying a rule not expressive of the moral judgment of
the people. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 813-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor perceived the main
issue to be whether Booth established a "rigid Eighth Amendment rule eliminating virtu-
ally all consideration of the victim at the penalty phase," or whether the jury could prop-
erly hear "information about the victim and the extent of the harm caused in arriving at
its moral judgment concerning the appropriate punishment." Id. at 814 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Justice O'Connor favored a narrower, less rigid, reading of Booth. Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 813 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 814 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
823 (1982)); see supra note 150.
173. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 818-19 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see supra note 152.
174. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 816 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Mills v. Maryland,
486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
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fendant is unnecessarily one-sided. 75
Thus, the focus of the debate in Booth and Gathers was on defin-
ing the defendant's culpability. In both decisions, the Court rea-
soned that the specific harm to the victims' families and the
identities of the victims were neither factors foreseeable by the de-
fendant, nor necessarily intended when the defendant chose to
act. 176 Based on its interpretation of precedent, the Court reasoned
that victim impact evidence generally does not relate to the defend-
ant's blameworthiness and asserted that only evidence directly re-
lating to the defendant and to the circumstances of the crime is
relevant to the sentencing decision. 17 7 Accordingly, victim impact
evidence that can distract the jury from its proper task is imper-
missible under the Eighth Amendment. 7 8
The dissents in both Booth and Gathers, however, focused on
cause and effect. The dissenting Justices argued that society de-
mands retribution for the direct harm and consequences of a de-
fendant's act. 179 Since the impact of a crime on the victim's family
is a direct consequence of the defendant's act, it is relevant to the
sentencing decision. 180 Each dissent buttressed its arguments with
the Court's holding in Tison v. Arizona that reckless indifference to
human life is as morally reprehensible as an "intent to kill."'"8
III. PA YNE v TENNESSEE
A. The Facts
In Payne v. Tennessee, 82 Pervis Tyrone Payne was convicted of
first-degree murder and assault with intent to commit murder in
the stabbing deaths of his female acquaintance and her daughter
and of the attempted murder of her young son.183 During the pen-
175. Id. at 820-21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that "information about
[Gather's] equally unique victim was relevant to the jury's assessment of the harm he had
caused and the appropriate penalty").
176. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987); Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810.
177. Booth, 482 U.S. at 508-09; Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811.
178. Booth, 482 U.S. at 509; Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811-12.
179. Booth, 482 U.S. at 516, 519-20 (dissenting opinions of Justice White and Justice
Scalia, respectively); Gathers, 490 U.S. at 818, 823 (dissenting opinions of Justice
O'Connor and Justice Scalia, respectively).
180. Booth, 482 U.S. at 518, 520 (dissenting opinions of Justice White and Justice
Scalia, respectively); Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810, 823 (dissenting opinions of Justice
O'Connor and Justice Scalia, respectively).
181. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 154 (1987); see relevant text of Tison quoted
supra note 152.
182. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
183. Id. at 2601. The daughter was two years old and the son was three years old.
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alty phase of the trial, Payne called four witnesses to testify on his
behalf.'84 The State called the victim's mother who testified re-
garding the continuing effect of the murders on her grandson. 5
While asking for the death penalty during closing arguments, the
prosecutor gave a moving account of the permanent loss suffered
by the boy and by the rest of the victims' surviving family. 18 6 The
jury sentenced Payne to death."8 7
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the
sentence, rejecting Payne's argument that the grandmother's testi-
mony and the prosecutor's statements violated his Eighth Amend-
ment rights under Booth and Gathers.""8 The court concluded that
the statements were relevant to Payne's personal responsibility and
moral guilt and that any violation under Booth and Gathers was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.8 9 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari"9 "to reconsider [its] holdings in
Booth and Gathers that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a capital
sentencing jury from considering 'victim impact' evidence relating
to the personal characteristics of the victim and the emotional im-
pact of the crimes on the victim's family."' 19 1
B. The United States Supreme Court Decision
In a six-to-three decision,' 92 the Court held that victim impact
evidence is not prohibited by the Eighth Amendment and over-
184. Id. at 2602. The witnesses included his parents, his girlfriend, and a psycholo-
gist who specialized in criminal evaluations. Id. They all testified generally that Payne
was a polite, caring, and affectionate person. Id. at 2602-03. The psychologist also stated
that Payne was mentally handicapped. Id. at 2602.
185. Id. at 2603.
186. Id. The prosecutor stated:
[Petitioner's attorney] wants you to think about a good reputation, people who
love the defendant .... He doesn't want you to think about the people who love
[the victim], her mother and daddy who loved her.... The brother who mourns
for [his sister] every single day and wants to know where his best little playmate
is. He doesn't have anybody to watch cartoons with him, a little one. These are
the things that go into why it is especially cruel, heinous, and atrocious, the
burden that child will carry forever.
Id.
187. Id.
188. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 18 (Tenn. 1990).
189. Payne, 791 S.W.2d at 19.
190. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10 (Tenn. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1031
(1991).
191. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2604 (emphasis added).
192. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 2601. Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter each filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 2611, 2613, 2614,
respectively. Justices Marshall and Stevens each filed dissenting opinions, both of which
were joined by Justice Blackmun. Id. at 2619, 2625, respectively.
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ruled both Booth and Gathers. 93 Writing for the majority in
Payne, Chief Justice Rehnquist accused the Booth and Gathers
Courts of misreading precedent and of unfairly stacking the scales
in a capital trial. 94 Rehnquist acknowledged that Woodson v.
North Carolina and Gregg v. Georgia required that the defendant be
considered individually 95 and that the defendant be provided the
opportunity to offer any mitigating evidence supporting a lesser
sentence.' 96 However, Rehnquist argued that those decisions did
not foreclose the State from offering evidence relating to the conse-
quences of the crime. 97 Instead, Rehnquist, echoing Justice
O'Connor in Gathers, maintained that to deny the state either "'a
glimpse of the life' which a defendant 'chose to extinguish' " or
consideration of the harm caused to society and to the victim's
family was neither necessitated by precedent nor justified by the
general tenets of criminal law. 198
The Payne Court reiterated the dissenting arguments in Booth
and Gathers that the criminal responsibility of a defendant is par-
tially measured by the foreseeable, though not necessarily in-
tended, consequences of his acts. 199  It then restated the
hypotheticals presented in those dissents purporting to show how
equally blameworthy defendants constitutionally could be assessed
differing penalties on the basis of the harm caused.2o°
The Court also addressed the Booth Court's concern that victim
impact evidence might be unconstitutionally" prejudicial to a de-
fendant whose victim is deemed to be a greater asset to society than
193. Id. at 2611.
194. Id. at 2607.
195. Id. at 2606-08 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.), and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
(1976)) (opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.).
196. Id. at 2606 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982)).
197. Id. at 2607.
198. Id. at 2605-07 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting)). To support this conclusion, the Court further quoted the Bible, "An
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth," and the 18th century criminologist Cesare Beccaria,
"we have seen that the true measure of crimes is the, injury done to society." Id. at 2605
(quoting Exodus 21:22-23 and Cesare Beccaria, reprinted in J. FARRER, CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTS 199 (London 1880)).
In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter also maintained that evidence of a crime's
effect on the victim traditionally has played a role in determining the culpability of a
particular defendant. Id. at 2614 (Souter, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 2605.
200. Id. at 2605; see supra notes 152, 155. The Court again cited Tison as authority
for this proposition. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605 (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 148
(1987)).
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one whose victim is deemed to be less "worthy. ' 20 1 The Payne
Court stated that the information was "not offered to encourage
comparative judgments of this kind, ' 20 2 but was offered instead to
show the uniqueness of the victim. 2 a The Court concluded that
victim impact evidence is merely one way to inform the jury of the
"specific harm caused by the crime." 2" It also reiterated the rea-
soning expressed in the Booth dissent that the State has a legitimate
interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence offered by the de-
fendant.20 5 If the information is, in fact, unduly prejudicial, the
Court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause provides a mechanism for relief.2°6
In summary, the Court rejected the contention that the presenta-
tion of victim impact evidence violated Payne's Eighth Amend-
ment rights.20 7 It held that victim impact statements and
arguments relating to the victim and the impact of the crime on the
victim's family are permissible during the sentencing of a capital
defendant and overruled Booth.2 °8 On the same basis, the Court
also overruled the Gathers holding that prevented the prosecutor
from describing the "human cost of the crime of which the defend-
ant stands convicted. ' ' 2°9
The Court rationalized its action in overruling the two decisions
by embarking on an analysis of stare decisis. It conceded the value
of the doctrine, but asserted that stare decisis is more important in
cases involving property and contract rights than in those involv-
201. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607 (citing Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506 (1987)).
202. Id. (emphasis added).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2608.
205. Id. ("Booth deprives the State of the full moral force of its evidence and may
prevent the jury from having before it all the information necessary to determine the
proper punishment for a first-degree murder.").
206. Id. Justice O'Connor also addressed this issue in her concurring opinion:
The possibility that this evidence may in some cases be unduly inflammatory
does not justify a prophylactic, constitutionally based rule that this evidence
may never be admitted .... If, in a particular case, a witness' testimony or a
prosecutor's remark so infects the sentencing proceeding as to render it funda-
mentally unfair, the defendant may seek appropriate relief under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
207. Id. at 2609.
208. Id. at 2611. However, since Payne did not concern evidence relating to the char-
acterization and opinions of the victim's family about the crime, the criminal, and the
appropriate punishment, that part of the Booth decision was not overruled by the Court.
Id. at 2611 n.2.
209. Id. at 2609. The Payne Court quoted Justice Cardozo: " '[J]ustice, though due
to the accused, is due to the accuser also.' " Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 122 (1934)).
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ing procedural and evidentiary rules. 2 10  Noting that thirty-three
previous constitutional decisions had been overruled in whole or in
part during the last twenty terms, the Court justified its action by
stressing that "Booth and Gathers were decided by the narrowest of
margins, over spirited dissents challenging the basic underpinnings
of those decisions. ' 211 Consequently, the doctrine of stare decisis
posed no barrier to the Court's decision in Payne.
C Justice Souter's Concurrence212
Justice Souter rejected the premise underlying the Booth Court's
contention that victim impact evidence is irrelevant to the defend-
ant's blameworthiness.2 13 He recognized the obligation to consider
the defendant's individuality but did not believe that such an obli-
gation forecloses a consideration of the foreseeable consequences of
the defendant's acts.21 4 Justice Souter posited that mentally com-
petent defendants know that their victims are unique and probably
have "survivors" who will suffer from the victim's death.215 He
found the defendant's knowledge of these foreseeable consequences
relevant to the defendant's blameworthiness and, therefore, rele-
vant to the sentencing decision.216
Justice Souter also considered the Booth rule unworkable.21 7
Since most sentencing decisions are made by the same jury that
determines the defendant's guilt, much of the evidence restricted
210. Id. at 2609-10. Chief Justice Rehnquist announced:
Stare decisis is not an inexorable command: rather, it "is a principle of policy
and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.". . . Consid-
erations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property
and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved... the opposite is true
in cases such as the present one involving procedural and evidentiary rules.
Id. (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)) (citations omitted).
211. Id. at 2610-11. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion focused on the issue of stare
decisis, defending the Payne holding against the opinion voiced by the dissent: "If there
was ever a case that defied reason, it was Booth v. Maryland, imposing a constitutional
rule that had absolutely no basis in constitutional text, in historical practice, or in logic."
Id. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
212. Justice Kennedy joined in Justice Souter's concurring opinion. Id. at 2614.
213. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
214. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
215. Id. at 2615 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter argued:
Just as defendants know that they are not faceless human ciphers, they know
that their victims are not valueless fungibles, and just as defendants appreciate
the web of relationships and dependencies in which they live, they know that
their victims are not human islands, but individuals with parents or children,
spouses or friends or dependents.
Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
216. Id. at 2616 (Souter, J., concurring).
217. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
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under Booth was already before the jury.2- 8 Therefore, either the
evidentiary rules at the trial would have to be changed, denying the
jury important contextual evidence about the crime, or a separate
jury would have to be empaneled for the sentencing phase, impos-
ing a severe burden on the states.21 9
D. The Dissents
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens 22° accused the majority
of falling prey to the political appeal of the victims' rights move-
ment.22' Stevens noted that neither the Constitution nor the com-
mon law requires even-handed treatment of the defendant and his
or her victim. 222 Although the State must prove the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, because the victim is not on trial,
the victim's character cannot constitute either an aggravating or a
mitigating circumstance.22 a
Justice Stevens identified two flaws in the use of victim impact
evidence. First, those facets of a victim's character that are not
foreseeable at the time the crime was committed are irrelevant to
the defendant's "'personal responsibility and moral guilt' " and,
therefore, are irrelevant to death penalty considerations.224 Sec-
ond, because the quantity and quality of victim impact evidence
sufficient to justify a death sentence is not known until after the
crime is committed, the use of such evidence conflicts with the
218. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
219. Id. at 2617 (Souter, J., concurring).
220. Id. at 2625 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun joined this dissent. Id.
221. Id. at 2627 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Today's majority has obviously been
moved by an argument that has a strong political appeal but no proper place in a rea-
soned judicial opinion."). Further, Justice Stevens concluded:
Given the current popularity of capital punishment in a crime-ridden society,
the political appeal of arguments that assume that increasing the severity of
sentences is the best cure for the cancer of crime, and the political strength of
the "victim's rights" movement, I recognize that today's decision will be
greeted with enthusiasm by a large number of concerned and thoughtful citi-
zens. The great tragedy of the decision, however, is the danger that the "hy-
draulic pressure of public opinion that Justice Holmes once described-and that
properly influences the deliberations of democratic legislatures-has played a
role not only in the Court's decision to hear this case, and in its decision to
reach the constitutional question without pausing to consider affirming on the
basis of the Tennessee Supreme Court's rationale, but even in its resolution of
the constitutional issue involved. Today is a sad day for a great institution.
Id. at 2631 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 2627 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 2628 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
801 (1982)).
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mandate that sentencing discretion be minimized in order to avoid
the danger of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.2 "
Justice Stevens also found flaws in the majority's contention that
the harm to a victim's family is foreseeable and therefore indicative
of the defendant's moral culpability. 26 Although he found the ex-
amples cited by the majority227 fully consistent with Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, he considered them inapposite to the
majority's conclusion.22 s Justice Stevens reasoned that the admis-
sion of victim impact evidence may result in the execution of cer-
tain defendants because of irrelevant and arbitrary factors. 29
Stevens concluded: "Today is a sad day for a great institution. 231
In addition, Justice Marshall wrote a separate dissent 23 1 focusing
on the "ominous" willingness of the Court to overrule its prece-
dents. 32 Marshall maintained that, historically, the Court never
had departed from its precedent without special justification-jus-
tification including a showing that the precedent was a detriment
to coherence and consistency in the law.233 In Marshall's view, the
majority did not meet this burden. In fact, Marshall found in the
majority's opinion the "radical assertion that it need not even
try. ' 234 Noting the failure of the majority to justify its decision on
grounds other than those voiced by the dissenters in Booth and
Gathers, Justice Marshall maintained that the motivation behind
the Court's departure from precedent was the change in the
Court's own personnel rather than any change in legal reasoning or
development.235 Marshall warned that the majority's decision in
Payne was an indication of the current Court's attitude toward the
rights of the under represented members of our society.236
225. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976)).
226. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227. See supra notes 152, 155, 200.
228. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2629 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 2630 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 2631 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also joined in this
opinion.
232. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall emphasized that Booth and Gath-
ers were premised on the assertion that "death is a 'punishment different from all other
sanctions,' " and that those decisions applied only to capital cases. Id. at 2620 n. 1 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). He argued that the Payne decision was unre-
sponsive to Eighth Amendment capital penalty jurisprudence requiring that unfairly
prejudicial and irrelevant information be barred from the sentencing hearing. Id. at
2620-21 n. 1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 2621-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 2621 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 2625 (Marshall J., dissenting). Justice Marshall cautioned:
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Payne v. Tennessee is analyti-
cally unsound and ignores the basic underpinnings of Eighth
Amendment death penalty jurisprudence. When the Court in
Furman v. Georgia invalidated many capital punishment statutes,
it made the acute observation that juries, provided with no objec-
tive criteria for assessing the appropriate penalty in capital cases,
were swayed by unquantifiable, subjective determinants.237 In
Furman, the Supreme Court found that the arbitrariness resulting
from that subjectivity violated the Eighth Amendment's ban
against cruel and unusual punishment.238
The decisions in Gregg v. Georgia and two of its companion cases
approved death penalty schemes that appeared to require height-
ened objectivity in capital sentencing. 239 Recognizing that capital
cases are qualitatively different from non-capital cases, the Gregg
Court required the sentencing authority to focus on the objective
characteristics of the defendant and the crime.240 The addition of
statutory aggravating and mitigating factors and the provision for
proportionality review on appeal created the expectation that the
death penalty would operate in a more even-handed and consistent
way. 241 These expectations, however, have not been fulfilled.2 42
Due to the overwhelming number of criminal defendants who
plead guilty, the sentencing determination is perhaps the most cru-
cial aspect of the criminal justice system.2 43 However, several com-
mentators maintain that despite the post-Furman attempts to
[T]he overruling of Booth and Gathers is but a preview of an even broader and
more far-reaching assault upon this Court's precedents. Cast aside today are
those condemned to face society's ultimate penalty. Tomorrow's victims may
be minorities, women, or the indigent. Inevitably, this campaign to resurrect
yesterday's "spirited dissents" will squander the authority and legitimacy of this
Court as a protector of the powerless.
Id. (Marshall J., dissenting).
237. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.).
238. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
239. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242 (1976); see supra notes 47-70 and accompanying text.
240. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
241. See BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 404, 409-11.
242. See id.
243. WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES 53 (1991) (report-
ing that approximately 70-90% of criminal defendants plead guilty or nolo contendere);
Roy L. Goldman & James W. Mullenix, Note, A Hidden Issue of Sentencing: Burdens of
Proof for Disputed Allegations in Presentence Reports, 66 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1515 & n.2
(1978) (stating that in 1974, over 84% of criminal defendants pled either no contest or
guilty).
1992]
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 23
ensure that capital defendants are punished on the basis of fair and
objective criteria, arbitrary elements continue to factor into the
result. 2 "
Extra-legal factors influencing the result of the capital sentenc-
ing process include: (1) the jurisdiction in which the crime oc-
curs;245 (2) the role of the prosecutor;246 (3) the competence of, and
the specific problems facing, the defense attorney; 247 and (4) jury
death penalty biases.248 These factors increase the likelihood that a
sentence of death will be imposed based on considerations that
bear no relationship to the crime or to the accused.
The data also show that it may be impossible to completely erad-
icate the effect of any particular juror's bias. The 1970s changes to
capital sentencing statutes were designed to objectively guide the
jury's sentencing decision. Of the typical list of aggravating cir-
cumstances, the jury's only subjective determination is whether the
murder was especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or manifesting ex-
ceptional depravity.249 On the other hand, the mitigating circum-
244. See, e.g., Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of Fairness.- The Arbitrary and Capricious
Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 797,
798-99 (1986).
245. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 243, at 54-55. For example, due largely to eco-
nomic reasons, prosecutors in small counties are more likely to offer the defendant a
chance to plea bargain. Id.
246. Id. at 54-57; see also Tabak, supra note 244, at 799-800 (positing that the prose-
cutor's decision to seek the death penalty often is based on political considerations);
NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 6, at 152-58 (noting that the role of the prosecutor and
the impact of the jurisdiction in which the crime occurs are tied closely together).
247. See Tabak, supra note 244, at 801-10. Tabak states that the capital defendant
often is represented inadequately due to the insufficient funding, inexperience (including a
lack of awareness of applicable legal principles), and overwhelming workload of counsel.
Id.; see AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, TOWARD A MORE JUST AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF
REVIEW IN STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES 6-17, 49-76 (1990). The problems of incom-
petent and underfunded counsel in death penalty cases led the ABA to include specific
recommendations regarding competent counsel in its report. Id.
248. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 243, at 186-207 (providing an entire chapter regard-
ing the problem of death-qualified juries); see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,
518-19 (1968) (holding that it is constitutionally permissible to exclude for cause all po-
tential jurors who are opposed to the death penalty). Professor White observed:
Under the Court's decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois, the prosecutor is per-
mitted to remove from a jury that will decide a capital defendant's penalty all
prospective jurors who state either (1) that they would automatically vote
against the death penalty ... or (2) that their attitude toward capital punish-
ment would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defend-
ant's guilt. ...
WHITE, supra note 243, at 186. A jury that is seated after death penalty-specific ques-
tioning is considered death-qualified.
249. See, e.g., supra note 86.
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stances require both subjective and objective assessments.25 °
Additionally, while the jury may be confined to finding enumerated
aggravating circumstances, the Court has required that any and all
relevant mitigating factors be taken into consideration. 251 These
formal changes flowed logically from the 1976 edict that the jury
focus on the particularized circumstances of the individual offense
and the individual offender before it can impose a sentence of
death.2 52 These changes also support Justice Stevens's contention
that the Constitution and the common law do not require an even-
handed treatment of the defendant and the victim.25 3
Despite the Court's refinements of capital sentencing, some re-
searchers have found that the statutory aggravating and mitigating
circumstances play less of a role than intended,2 54 while others
have found that race, particularly the victim's race, continues to
play a pivotal role in capital sentencing determinations. 25 5 The
250. See, e.g., supra note 87.
251. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 (1978).
252. See supra notes 47-70 and accompanying text.
253. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2627 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or
Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1
(1988). In this interesting study, the authors interviewed fifty-four jurors in ten compara-
bly aggravated capital murder cases: in five, the jury recommended life imprisonment; in
the other five, the jury recommended death. Id. at 8-9, 26. Thirty-five jurors indicated
that the statutory list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances had "little or no im-
pact" on their decision while only four indicated that they were "greatly" influenced by
the list. Id. at 24. In the cases in which imprisonment was recommended, sixty-nine
percent of the jurors attributed their decision, at least in part, to "lingering doubt," id. at
27, while in the cases in which death was recommended, the manner of the killing was the
most important statistical factor, followed by the perception that death was either
mandatory or presumptively appropriate for first-degree murder, id. at 40. Based on
their survey, the authors conclude that capital sentencing decisions cannot be sufficiently
guided to operate satisfactorily in practice. See id. at 53-54.
255. Many studies have been conducted on this subject, including: David C. Baldus
et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experi-
ence, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 728-31 (1983) [hereinafter Baldus et al., Com-
parative Review] (reporting that the killer of a white victim is more likely to receive the
death penalty than the killer of a black victim and concluding that the overall data sug-
gest that the Georgia death sentencing scheme remains inconsistent and arbitrary despite
the statutorily required proportionality review); Raymond Paternoster, Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion in Requesting the Death Penalty: A Case of Victim-Based Racial Discrimination,
18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 437, 473-74 (1984) (finding that in multiple felony homicides, the
more aggravated the homicide, the less important the race of the victim becomes; but that
when the homicide involves only one statutory aggravating felony, the probability of a
death penalty request is almost three times greater when the victim is white rather than
black); Gennaro F. Vito & Thomas J. Keil, Capital Sentencing in Kentucky: An Analysis
of the Factors Influencing Decision Making in the Post-Gregg Period, 79 J. CRIM. L. &
Loyola University Law Journal
data shows that despite the statutory guidelines, juries continue to
be swayed by impermissible, subjective factors-most notably the
race of the victim. Allowing victim impact evidence into the pen-
alty phase of a capital trial sanctions the influence of these subjec-
tive factors by authorizing the jury to focus on the victim and not
on the accused.
The foreseeability argument advanced by the Court in Payn256
to support its contention that victim impact information illustrates
the defendant's blameworthiness is logically flawed. It certainly is
true that a determination of the harm caused by the defendant as a
result of his criminal acts is an important concern in criminal law,
both in determining the elements of the offense and in determining
the appropriate punishment.257 The different degrees of loss suf-
fered by society and by a victim's family are already recognized by
the criminal law. For example, an inchoate crime is not punished
to the same degree as a completed crime.2
However, neither the Payne Court's reliance on Tison v. Ari-
zona 259 nor the hypotheticals employed by the Court bolster the
argument that the same principles should apply to evidence regard-
ing the victim and the impact of the death on the victim's family.2 °
In Tison, the Court held that "reckless indifference to human life"
is as legally blameworthy as "intent to kill" when that recklessness
results in the loss of life. 26 ' The Tison Court looked to the foresee-
ability of the resulting harm in the context of the defendants'
CRIMINOLOGY 483, 502 (1988) (concluding that prosecutors are more likely to seek the
death penalty when a black kills a white than in other murder cases).
The exhaustive data compiled in the Baldus study was presented to the Court in Mc-
Cleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 283-93 (1987). Although it assumed the study's statisti-
cal validity, in a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected McCleskey's Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims of arbitrariness and racial discrimination absent a showing that dis-
crimination had actually influenced the results in that case. See BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL
JUSTICE, supra note 46; Baldus et al, Comparative Review, supra, at 294-99, 306-20.
256. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2605 (1991); see supra notes 199-200 and
accompanying text. This argument is essentially the same as that put forward by the
dissenters in Booth. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 519-20 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); see supra notes 152, 155 and accompanying text.
257. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605. But see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punish-
ment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA.
L. REV. 1497, 1601-03 (1974) (characterizing the focus of criminal law on the actual
harm caused as "irrational" because the harm may be unrelated to the defendant's moral
blameworthiness).
258. See Schulhofer, supra note 257, at 1602-03.
259. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
260. See supra notes 152, 155 and accompanying text.
261. Tison, 481 U.S. at 157; see supra note 152.
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mental states.262 Determining that the murder in that case was
foreseeable, the Tison Court held that the defendants could be exe-
cuted for the foreseeable, although not necessarily intended, harm
that resulted from their acts.263 Yet, neither Tison nor the hy-
potheticals used by the Payne Court justify the Payne Court's as-
sertion that loss is determined by the identity of the victim, often a
matter of chance, or by the existence of someone able to articulate
the unique personal suffering caused by the crime. Instead, ac-
cording to the Payne Court's reasoning, two equally brutal
murders will have two different "consequences" and will thus be
accorded two different levels of blameworthiness depending on the
quality of the victim impact evidence presented.
Similarly, the Payne Court's judgment that victim impact evi-
dence will not introduce arbitrariness into capital penalty trials is
poorly reasoned. If a victim leaves behind no family to testify or if
the victim simply is unsympathetic, the information may not be
introduced. However, because no two equally aggravated or miti-
gated murders will affect a family in exactly the same way, the
information contained in an offered VIS is highly arbitrary.2M
While it may be true that victim impact evidence is not introduced
to encourage impermissible comparative judgments,265 it may be
impossible to determine when the information has that effect. On
the other hand, that it will have some effect is not debatable. What
reasonably compassionate person could help feeling an overwhelm-
ing sympathy for the victim or his or her family and a correspond-
ing abhorrence for the defendant, after listening to the statements
offered in Booth, Gathers, and Payne?
Similarly, the Booth Court's concern that the defendant will be
unable to rebut the victim impact evidence has merit.2 66 Not only
may the defendant have difficulty finding witnesses willing to pres-
ent negative testimony about the victim's character or the impact
262. Tison, 481 U.S. at 157-58.
263. Id.
264. See Lodowski v. Maryland, 490 A.2d 1228, 1266-67 (N.J. 1985) (Cole, J., con-
curring). Judge Cole stated:
[I]t is arbitrary to base a decision as to whether an accused should live or die on
the basis of subjective impressions a widow has of the crime and the funeral
.... [I]t is irrelevant to the death penalty decision that the daughter of a mur-
der victim undergoes psychiatric treatment for the emotional injury caused by
the offense.
Id. (Cole, J., concurring).
265. See supra text accompanying note 202.
266. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506-07 (1987); see supra note 131 and accom-
panying text.
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on the victim's family, but, if the defendant is successful, this testi-
mony may not have the desired effect. With life hanging in the
balance, a jury may well suspect any rebuttal evidence the defend-
ant presents.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Booth and Gathers were based
on the tenet that "death is different." This principle requires
courts to provide capital defendants with increased safeguards in
order to ensure that sentencing decisions are based on fair and ob-
jective criteria. By overruling Booth and Gathers in Payne v. Ten-
nessee, the Court casts aside that doctrine and holds that the
Eighth Amendment permits arbitrary and capricious action on the
part of a capital sentencing jury.
Booth, Gathers, and Payne were convicted for their acts of mur-
der. For their crimes, they have been punished. For those who
unfortunately follow in their footsteps, their punishments should
not be arbitrarily influenced by the introduction of victim impact
evidence into the sentencing hearing.
V. IMPACT
In the most superficial and immediate sense, the impact of Payne
already has been felt. To date, courts faced with the constitutional
admissibility of victim impact evidence have followed the Payne
decision.2 67  However, because the Court seems to relegate the
"death is different" doctrine to the position of an interesting,
though not highly significant, relic of capital sentencing jurispru-
dence, the Payne decision may have a substantial impact on capital
sentencing procedures generally. 261
While the decision in Payne was limited to evidence and argu-
ment relating to the victim and to the impact of the victim's death
on the victim's family, the decision in Payne leaves open the ques-
tion of the constitutional admissibility of the family's opinions of
the defendant and of the appropriate sentence.2 69 The Payne deci-
sion indicates that, should that specific issue arise once more before
the Court, decisions on leniency could be influenced by the particu-
lar capital punishment attitudes of a victim's family.27° Such a de-
267. See, e.g., State v. Greenway, 823 P.2d 22 (Ariz. 1991); Watts v. State, No. 74-
776, 1992 WL 157 (Fla. Jan. 2, 1992); People v. Howard, No. 65-473, 1991 WL 269121
(Ill. Dec. 19, 1991).
268. Ironically, in Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991), decided on the
same day as Payne, the Court used the "death is different" doctrine to justify the need for
sentencing proportionality in capital cases but not in non-capital cases. Id. at 2701-02.
269. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2611 n.2 (1991).
270. As previously noted, victim impact forms often solicit such opinions. See supra
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cision would allow yet another arbitrary element to invade the
capital penalty determination.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Payne v. Tennessee is signifi-
cant for a number of reasons. First, it contradicts the spirit of the
Eighth Amendment death penalty cases by justifying the introduc-
tion of arbitrary, capricious, and inflammatory evidence into the
sentencing phase of a capital trial. Second, by basing its decision
almost exclusively on the arguments rejected by Booth and Gath-
ers, Payne sets a dangerous precedent and justifies Justice Mar-
shall's accusation that the change in the law was based on the
change in the Court's personnel. The Payne decision indeed does
raise the specter that a "campaign to resurrect yesterday's 'spirited
dissents' will squander the authority and legitimacy of [the] Court
as a protector of the powerless."' 27 1 With its opinion that the role
of stare decisis is at its lowest ebb in such cases, we can only won-
der what decision the current Court will choose to reconsider next.
"Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court's
decisionmaking."272
AIDA ALAKA
notes 105-09 and accompanying text; see also State v. Sumpter, 438 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Iowa
1989) (noting, in a second-degree murder case, the natural assumption that "family mem-
bers would be bitter toward a defendant . . .and that a hanging, if possible, would be
appreciated"). But see Pope's Plea Stops Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1992, at A14
(reporting that Texas Governor Ann Richards, influenced by requests for clemency by
the Pope, granted a last-minute stay of execution for a man sentenced to death for the
rape and murder of a nun).
271. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2625 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Marshall is not the only person to suggest that the rights of criminal defendants will
be curtailed by the current Court. See, e.g., Ted Gest, Reining in Citizens' Rights, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 16, 1991, at 49.
272. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2625 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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